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The comprehensive planning of a government's 
actions is useful only if it takes the form of a calculus 
which precedes and then provides for the monitor-
ing of these actions so that day-to-day planning tasks 
become part of a practical process. The author 
asserts, however, that in the processes of govern-
ment seen in the Latin American countries, a consid-
erable gap generally exists between such plans and 
the actual process of discussion and decision-making 
which guides government action. This ineffective-
ness of planning fosters a shortsighted style of 
government which often reacts only belatedly and 
spasmodically to the problems that arise. The author 
argues that the capacity of those who govern is 
measured by the results of their efforts in relation to 
the difficulty of the government scheme undertaken 
and the degree of governability of the system in 
question. In this regard, he underscores the need to 
increase the capacity to govern by providing govern-
ment officials with adequate training and by adopt-
ing techniques of planning and government which 
are in keeping with the complexity of the social 
systems of today. 
'Senior ILPES planning expert. The views expressed 
in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do 
not necessarily coincide with those of the Organization. 
Environmental planning falls within the sphere 
of comprehensive planning and can be effective 
only if the latter actually performs its practical 
functions. The overall planning of a govern-
ment's actions is, in its turn, only useful if it 
represents a calculus which precedes such 
actions and which provides for the overseeing of 
activity on a day-to-day basis, i.e., if it becomes a 
practical process. Even the most superficial con-
sideration of governmental processes in the 
Latin American countries, however, reveals a 
clear separation (of varying characteristics and 
intensities) between these plans and the prom-
ises they make, on the one hand, and the actual 
process of discussion and decision-making which 
guides the daily activities of the authorities, on 
the other. 
This ineffectiveness of comprehensive plan-
ning facilitates and fosters a style of government 
lacking in foresight which is dominated by day-
to-day affairs of little consequence and whose 
strongest signs of vitality are associated with 
belated and spasmodic attempts to deal with the 
problems raining down upon it. These impro-
vised sorts of on-the-spot calculations become a 
superficial alternative to planning and place a 
series of constraints on environmental planning 
and control, which, by their very nature, should 
not focus on repairing the sometimes irrepara-
ble damage that has already been done, but 
rather on preventing further damage. 
All practical planning exercises are a mea-
sured combination of forward-looking calcula-
tions, whose input is provided by ongoing 
simulations of the future, and of reactive calcula-
tions, whose feedback comes from the monitor-
ing of problems as they become more or less 
severe. The predominant style of government in 
the countries of the region, however, leaves vir-
tually no room for such forward-looking calcula-
tions; all its energy is devoted to devising 
emergency responses to the existing problems 
which pose a threat to its popular support. 
Understanding the nature of this gap 
between government and planning is of the 
utmost importance because, going beyond the 
bounds of the ideologies upon which the various 
political schemes of government are based, it 
leads to ineffective action and a lack of faith 
among the population in its leaders which ulti-
mately threaten the democratic system. The 
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Latin American people are steadily losing confi-
dence in the ability of the political parties —and 
of the governments they form— to solve or even 
alleviate their problems. They see with dismay 
that election platforms cannot be regarded as 
commitments or promises made in good faith 
and watch as the plans diverge from the election 
promises and as the government's practices 
stray, in their turn, from the plans. It is becom-
ing increasingly common for the man in the 
street to say that the political parties are capable 
of winning elections but incapable of governing 
effectively. After having waited for a time, the 
citizenry "punishes" the government by with-
drawing support and, in the end, voting for the 
opposition in the next elections. This punish-
ment does not, however, result in an improve-
ment in government practices; the political 
leaders do not learn from the past but instead 
repeat the same mistakes. Thus, this 
punishment-vote in presidential elections 
expresses a judgement on the government's 
effectiveness which fails to engender greater 
effectiveness, but which does generate discour-
agement and a lack of trust in the long run. How 
long can a system last whose main benefit is to 
guarantee us the freedom to watch in peace as 
problems grow worse? How long will such peace 
endure in the absence of effectiveness, justice 
and employment but in the presence of hunger? 
In accounting for this gap we, the professional 
planners, bear almost as much responsibility as 
political leaders and governmental authorities. 
The processes of winning elections, formu-
lating development plans in the traditional 
manner and producing measures during a term 
of government conform to different types of 
dynamics which are guided by differing criteria 
of effectiveness, take place in widely varying 
contexts and involve quite distinct agents. Fig-
ures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the bases for 
the dissociation within the prevailing system 
which exist among the electoral platform, the 
traditional normative economic plan and 
government action. 
At the electoral level, the agents are differ-
ent from those involved in the government's 
economic plan and government action. The 
Figure 1 
A : Election promises kept which were not part of the plan. 
B : Election promises kept which were part of the plan. 
C : Plans carried out which were not part of the election platform. 
D : Election promises not kept even though they were part of the plan. 
E : Results produced which do not correspond to the election platform or the plan. 
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Figure 2 
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constraint 
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criteria of effectiveness, the constraints and the 
relations among influential forces are also differ-
ent, The electoral environment and institutions 
generate motivations and practices that are 
almost diametrically opposed to those present 
within the setting of State government in which 
the design of the economic plan and the routine 
bureaucratic administration of public agencies 
take place. 
The citizenry undergoes a parallel process, 
but as a spectator. In the excitement of the elec-
tions, the people build up their hopes and bestow 
victory or defeat upon the political parties and 
their leaders; later, however as they realize that 
election promises are not being kept and as they 
witness a repetition of the same inability to 
overcome the force of routine, this gives way to 
apathy. After becoming disillusioned, the people 
await the next opportunity to take revenge, 
when they can exercise their punishment-vote. 
Do these governmental practices stem from a 
lack of capacity, a lack of willingness, or both? Or 
is it that the system is not very governable? 
The usual response to these questions is to 
point to the indisputable existence of different 
and conflicting interests on the part of various 
social forces. We are told that these processes of 
government are not ineffective for everyone, 
that they benefit a dominant minority. Behind 
the failure for the many lies success for the few. 
This argument is valid, but it does not explain 
the entire problem. The dominant minorities 
may also be ineffective and pay a high price for 
their success. Are we not all familiar with cases 
in which entrepreneurs have demanded given 
economic policies that end up depressing their 
own markets, and others in which workers have 
fought for projects which turn out to limit 
employment and concentrate income? Does not 
our recent history include examples of govern-
ment practices which have destroyed the 
government's own base of political support as a 
result of passivity, its misreading of the situa-
tion, bureaucratic inefficiency, disinformation, 
inconsistent actions and its slowness to react as 
problems grow worse? Is it true that these 
governments are efficient for some and deficient 
for others or, in other words, that their actions 
are skewed in such a way that the majorities 
lacking in political influence must bear the brunt 
of their shortcomings? 
Is there a problem in relation to the science 
and techniques of government which affects 
governments of widely varying ideologies and 
political bases? 
The capacity of government authorities is 
measured by the results of their efforts in rela-
tion to the difficulty of the governmental scheme 
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they attempt to carry out and the degree of 
governability of the system in which they act. 
There are, thus, three interlinking variables in 
the theory of government: government capacity, 
the governmental scheme and the governability 
of the system. 
One of the central ideas which will be dis-
cussed in this article is that of creating govern-
ment capacity through the proper preparation of 
leaders, particularly within the politico-technical 
stratum of society, and of creating or adapting 
techniques of government and planning that are 
suited to the complexity of the social system to 
be governed. 
Political leaders are "made" in the practical 
training ground ruled by the demands of political 
competition. The politico-technical stratum of 
society, however, is the product of formal 
schools and, in the long run, raises the qualifica-
tions required to engage in this political compe-
tition; consequently it also increases the quality 
of the training received by political leaders in the 
practical realm of day-to-day affairs. It can there-
fore be asserted that the creation of politico-
technical teams having a superior level of 
theoretical knowledge and sound practical expe-
rience will foster an improvement in the level 
and quality of political leaders and practical pol-
itical action. 
Unfortunately, this techno-political stratum 
is quite poorly developed in Latin America. The 
Latin American milieu and its universities pro-
duce economists who turn a blind eye to politics, 
politicians who turn a deaf ear to economics, and 
political scientists who are undisturbed by the 
lack of communication between the two. As a 
result, in the course of the political process 
within the Latin American countries, there is 
direct contact, but no communication, between 
two agents who speak different languages and 
who work with incompatible theories: the con-
ventional politician and the conventional techni-
cal expert. The result is obvious: there can be no 
agreement between them, unless it is founded 
upon mutual trust. Thus, a complex theoretical 
problem of interaction among the social sciences 
becomes, in political practice, one of interper-
sonal trust. A political leader has confidence in 
some economists and not in others, but he does 
not understand the economic problem involved. 
His situation is analogous to that of a patient 
who must rely upon his doctor's skill because he 
cannot judge it for himself. Trust offers the only 
hope for understanding. This already serious 
situation becomes thoroughly complex if the 
economist does not understand the political 
problem either, even assuming (which cannot 
always be done) that he has a firm grasp of the 
problem in his own area of specialization. Natu-
rally, this dialogue is unproductive and fails to 
get to the heart of the problems concerned, in 
addition to fostering superficial policies. The 
economic explanation of the problem sheds no 
light on its political explanation, and the con-
verse is also true. Between the two participants 
in this dialogue, an indepth understanding of the 
situation is impossible; all that is possible is a 
mere aggregation of knowledge and experience 
which does nothing to improve the quality of the 
explanation. 
The main task before us today is to create 
this techno-political capacity with a view to 
increasing government effectiveness in complex 
situations of shared power. This cannot be 
accomplished by training a cadre of public man-
agers, as some mistakenly believe, even though 
such managers are also essential, provided that 
the development of the nascent theory of the 
organization keeps pace with the urgent practi-
cal demands being made upon it. In any event, 
such managers preside over a limited opera-
tional and situational sphere, are subject to pre-
viously established guidelines and draw upon the 
resources assigned to them for the completion of 
their task; their training prepares them to solve 
problems in cases where the overriding objec-
tives have already been laid down by policy-
makers or executive planners. 
The techno-political expert, however is not 
advised of his objectives, but must instead 
develop objectives and then help to decide 
among them; nor does he accept resource con-
straints as a given, because it is within his power 
to propose means of creating new resources. 
Hence, his work prompts him to engage in polit-
ical dialogue, as well as in technical discussions 
concerning both his orientation (objectives) and 
guidelines (operations and means). His scope of 
action takes in the whole of society. This liaison 
between the politician and the technical expert is 
necessary so that these two agents can combine 
their know-how in explaining a situation. The 
techno-political expert does not need to have the 
charisma of a leader because his activities may be 
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conducted away from the public eye as he con-
centrates on a keen observation of political, eco-
nomic, social and technical processes. He does, 
however, need to have other special capabilities 
which the political leader does not find it essen-
tial to cultivate. 
The techno-political expert must be a true 
action-oriented social scientist, unbothered by 
any complexes about directly exploring the 
future, capable of understanding that action does 
not wait for the development of theories, alert to 
the need of avoiding the detours of the sociolo-
gist who takes delight only in the past, aware of 
the fact that —with few exceptions— econo-
mists tend to reason unidimensionally on the 
basis of a function of economic production in 
which there is only one scarce resource and only 
one criterion of effectiveness: the economic one. 
The scarcity of power, know-how, information, 
leadership, organizational capabilities, etc., is 
not figured into the economist's accounts. The 
techno-political expert should also stand ready 
to deal with political planning in the form of a 
situational calculus within the context of a crea-
tive and uncertain process, and must therefore 
avoid the digressions of which the political 
scientist is sometimes guilty. The main thrust of 
the political scientist's theory should concern the 
calculus which precedes practical action and 
which guides it. If the political scientist takes 
refuge in the history of political ideas to the 
exclusion of all else, in one-síded techniques of 
political analysis, in the use of the worst sort of 
microeconomics as a basis for a micro-theory of 
public policies, or in closed, mechanical and 
rationalistic concepts of decision-making theory, 
he is evading the central problem of his disci-
pline and reducing its usefulness as a tool for 
men of action. In reality, this type of political 
scientist fails to draw a distinction between open 
and closed processes, between repetitive and 
creative ones, and, as a consequence, sometimes 
adopts theories and techniques of decision-
making that are relevant only in closed and den-
umerable processes which are more typical of 
some physical mechanical^ systems. In the social 
system, however, possibilities do not exist; we 
ourselves or others create them. Consequently, 
they are not readily denumerable and decisions 
concerning them cannot be based on uni-rational 
criteria. 
The above list of requirements notwith-
standing, the type of techno-political expert who 
is needed is not a superman, much less a techno-
crat. If we consider what the scientist who works 
with general systems theory now knows or 
hopes to know in time, we find a similar case to 
the one of interest here. It is not a question of 
gaining an indepth knowledge of all the relevant 
domains, but rather of gaining an indepth under-
standing of the general aspects common to all of 
them; with the help of this meta-theory, a given 
area of specialization can then be seen in a new 
light, and this perspective can serve as a basis for 
interaction with other specialists and with prac-
tical politicians. The techno-political expert is a 
man who aspires to a social meta-science and, 
while it does not yet exist, does not feel obliged 
to remain blind and trapped within the boundar-
ies of a partial or one-sided science. He is, then, 
simply a social scientist who takes a practical 
outlook, who is disheartened by the futility of 
theorizing about theories and is moved to theo-
rize about the reality in which he lives, who is 
obsessed with the desire to devise methods and 
techniques that will be of service to men of 
action, who feels no respect for "official" science, 
who is humbled by the complexity of events, but 
alert to the developments taking place at the 
outer frontier of the sciences and to the develop-
ment of the sciences in their respective frontiers. 
He is aware that the social product of his endea-
vours is surrounded by a world in which there are 
many resources in short supply, many criteria of 
effectiveness, many rationalities and various 
self-contained explicative frames of reference. 
He thus becomes the enemy of reductionism to 
any single monotonous criterion of effective-
ness. The development and refinement of a type 
of situational planning which attempts to take 
the above-mentioned complexities into consid-
eration will thus provide a useful tool for endea-
vours at the techno-political level. 
There is an urgent need for this new 
politico-technical stratum in governmental 
structures, political parties and social forces in 
general. As a result of the modernization pro-
cess, the situational planner of the future will be 
positioned at the apex of a network of critical 
nexuses in the social system, whereas the exist-
ing economic planning offices, after undergoing 
a radical restructuring, will be only one link in a 
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vast network of situational calculus at the princi-
pal levels of the social system. 
The preceding discussion provides the foun-
dation for the following ten theses concerning 
the reasons for the overall ineffectiveness of the 
governments of Latin America. 
THESIS No. 1: Latin American planning 
methods are primitive, rigid and incapable of 
aiding a political leadership which governs a 
complex, dynamic, creative, résistent system 
plagued by elements of uncertainty. 
The normative economic planning which 
serves as the basis for planning as it is commonly 
practised in Latin America holds it in a strait-
jacket, rendering it powerless to address the 
complexity of creative social processes or to pro-
vide support for men of action, who are faced 
with an indivisible reality and hemmed in on all 
sides by a multitude of resource constraints. It 
does not perceive the existence of social agents 
as such because it confuses them with economic 
agents; it does not recognize the existence of 
opponents; it assumes that the social system is 
governed by laws rather than creating them; it 
identifies a shortage of resources with a scarcity 
of economic resources; it operates on the basis of 
a single, dominant criterion of effectiveness: 
economic effectiveness; it distances itself from 
real problems by analysing reality at the sectoral 
level; it clings to the imprecise concept of diag-
nostic analysis as a means of explaining the 
reality of the system in which it operates because 
for it, since it does not distinguish opponents, 
there is no "self" and no "other" who undertake 
planning from the vantage points of different 
situations; its central concern is the future, while 
it stands aloof from the present. Hence, it con-
fuses planning with design. It is a sort of 
medium-term economic architecture which con-
cerns itself exclusively with the normative 
sphere of what "ought to be". Due to this nar-
rowness and rigidity, it is of no use to the politi-
cal leadership of the government. The theory of 
situational planning is an attempt to resolve this 
problem. 
THESIS No. 2: The methods of government 
used by the State and those used by political 
parties and social forces are equally primitive 
and ineffective. 
Democracy is eroded and weakened if politi-
cal, trade-union and entrepreneurial organiza-
tions are governed ineffectively, because this 
ineffectiveness is then invariably reproduced in 
the government of the State. Democracy begins 
to give way if social problems which are an 
affront to human dignity are accepted as being 
necessary and natural evils. Nothing is more 
lethal for democracy than stultifying routine and 
the subjection of its leaders to the evils which 
abound in daily life. One hundred years of 
inequalities are one hundred years of problems. 
The passage of time does not transform prob-
lems into a fact of life or an acceptable norm. 
Problems which have been in existence for one 
hundred years are old problems, not new condi-
tions that should be accepted. Governing is not 
the same thing as managing affairs; it is resolv-
ing current or potential problems. Poverty, 
social marginalization, the unequal distribution 
of income, the concentration of political power, 
the lack of participation, urban crowding, eco-
logical degradation, slums, the ineffectiveness of 
the State apparatus and our own ineffectiveness 
in governing are not necessary evils of demo-
cracy. If they were, we would not desire demo-
cracy, defend it or fight to regain it. These 
problems exist because either we do not know 
how to solve them or we do not have the will to 
do so. Both of these situations contribute to the 
diversion of governmental attention to trivial 
concerns. 
Governing is becoming increasingly com-
plex, and governing in a democracy is even more 
so. The leader who steers his government in the 
direction of social progress has greater demands 
placed upon him than the leader whose sole 
governmental aspiration is to keep problems 
under control. Hence, the leader who has less 
ambitious objectives also labours under less 
severe constraints. 
The crucial questions are these: Are we or 
are we not prepared to govern effectively? Will 
we commit the same errors as in the past? Will 
our anxiousness to preserve democracy cause us 
to lose sight of our objectives? or Will our fear of 
losing sight of our objectives cause us to fail to 
preserve democracy? Will the ideologism of 
democracy or the ideologism of a specific utopia 
obscure the strategy and techniques for calculat-
ing the course of effective action? 
I believe that exceptionally qualified govern-
mental teams will be needed to deal with the 
problems of the future; otherwise, democracy 
will become impossible. I believe that the most 
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serious dilemma of our times is posed by the gap 
between our capacity to govern social systems 
and the increasing complexity of guiding these 
systems towards democratically-established 
objectives. This gap is widening and may con-
tinue to do so for a long time to come because we 
have been more concerned with making pro-
gress in the natural sciences so that we may 
attain a capacity for governing nature than we 
have been with the sciences, techniques and arts 
of action in social systems that would allow us to 
reach new heights of effectiveness in the art of 
governing our countries. The electrons which 
exist today, and the physical world in general, are 
of the same complexity as they were millions of 
years ago, but the countries of Latin America 
conform to social systems which are infinitely 
more complex today than in the past. Social 
systems are not only much more complex than 
natural systems are, but also are of a growing and 
different sort of complexity. The social system 
not only follows certain laws; it also creates laws. 
It is a creative system. Man, however, has con-
centrated his efforts on developing theories 
which give him an ever greater capacity to gov-
ern the simplest sphere (nature) while neglect-
ing the development of his capacity to govern 
the most complex sphere (society). Governing is 
not only an art; it is also increasingly a science, 
but this science must be capable of addressing 
creative processes in which knowledge is not 
always synonymous with the discovery of the 
laws that rule given processes. An increasing 
incapacity to govern social systems is what ulti-
mately causes man's relationships with nature to 
careen out of control. It will not primarily be 
ecological research that will make it possible to 
improve man's management of the environ-
ment, but rather research into the sciences and 
techniques of governing social systems. 
This is the great challenge of governing in a 
democracy. Once again, questions arise: Are we 
using our time wisely to improve our prepared-
ness for bringing about change, from the smal-
lest modification to transformations of 
overwhelming importance, and for participating 
in these processes? Are the progressive political 
parties of Latin America aware that something 
much more complex is needed to prepare new 
generations of leaders than the schools where 
cadres are now trained? Have we understood the 
fact that we are managing the economy poorly 
and failing to put our power and natural resour-
ces to good use while wasting time and idle 
resources, or are we still blaming fate, the 
preceding government, the outside world, the 
international economic crisis or flaws in the 
message we send to the social media? Have we 
grasped the fact that in order to modernize the 
State we must first modernize the modernizers? 
Have we learned from our mistakes that our 
most primitive and inefficient institutional 
structures are our leadership structures, that 
governing is more than just an art, and that 
governing in a spirit of progress and democracy 
requires an even greater measure of science and 
technique? 
In all of Latin America there is not a single 
centre of advanced training for young people 
who wish to develop their political or politico-
technical vocation in a scientific manner. In all of 
Latin America there is not a single centre where 
present political leaders can gather to refresh 
their experience and further develop their 
knowledge. There is not a single school of 
government sciences and techniques in all of 
Latin America. There is not a single centre in 
which Venezuelans can join with Chileans, Peru-
vians, Ecuadorians, Brazilians, a centre open to 
all the countries of Latin America where young 
people can learn to master the sciences and tech-
niques of government, strengthen their demo-
cratic values and renew their cultural identity 
and personality. There is not a single place 
where Latin Americans can go to grapple with 
the complex problems involved in governing 
creative and uncertain processes, where they can 
learn about widespread situations on which little 
information is available, about strategic plan-
ning in an uncertain context which takes the 
activity of opposing forces into consideration, 
about the analysis of integral situations, the 
issues of security and defence and how to 
approach them in a way that is in keeping with 
the consolidation of democracy, the study of for-
eign relations, of the techniques of negotiation, 
gamesmanship and human process simulation, 
of the infant modern organizational theory, and 
many other disciplines which the modern politi-
cian must master if he is not to be a helpless 
victim of technocratic advisers whose perspec-
tive is often distorted by one-sided, perhaps 
already outdated sciences which they apply with-
out reference to political interests and needs. 
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Nor is there a place where young Latin Ameri-
can politicians and technical experts can form 
bonds of friendship and common values which 
later, when they rise to positions of power, will 
lead to the mutual understanding and trust 
among them that is so necessary to the pursu-
ance of common regional and international 
objectives for Latin America, such as economic 
integration, cultural integration, international 
democratic solidarity, and the penetration of the 
international economic and financial sphere by 
the capital of Latin American democracies so 
that they will no longer be merely foreign depos-
itors and clients of an oppressive financial sys-
tem that is monopolized by the major powers. In 
order to do all this, however, and to do it with the 
necessary direction and scope, we must techni-
calize politics and politicize the technicians. We 
also have to introduce a greater sense of truth 
into politics and strengthen ethical values. We 
have to safeguard the policies of statesmen from 
digressions into micro-policies which are 
defended on the pretext that a certain detour is 
necessary in order to reach our objectives, when 
all too frequently it turns out to be a deviation 
that further distances us from them. We have to 
develop our imagination and our will and use 
them to create a different future. At the veFy 
¡east, we have to accord as much importance to 
the techniques of government as we do to those 
of winning elections or of gaining power by 
force. 
THESIS No. 3: The political culture, dominated 
by a sense of immediacy and by a raw sort of 
pragmatism, focuses on the intermediate prob-
lems affecting the political system while ignor-
ing the terminal problems affecting the social 
system. 
Major policy and planning are concerned 
with the solution of the terminal problems of the 
social system. Such problems are the result of the 
conduct of government over time. Micro-policy, 
on the other hand, is concerned with interme-
diate and immediate problems. This is a sound 
division of labour, so long as the resources we 
allocate for the resolution of intermediate prob-
lems (principally our time) are essential to the 
solution of terminal problems. These interme-
diate problems are burdensome and relate to 
domestic political issues, matters of protocol, 
micro-negotiations required to maintain the 
leadership position and cohesion of political for-
ces, political clientage, the administration of 
bureaucratic routine, reactive and defensive 
moves in micro-political struggles, political 
action in response to immediate problems, and 
formal or empty efforts to attain given economic 
targets in relation to the budget, monetary pol-
icy, external trade, etc.; and these problems 
become divorced from the terminal economic 
problems of the social system, such as growth, 
employment, income distribution, social margi-
nality, urban crowding, environmental damage, 
the irrational use of space, etc. 
If micro-policy overpowers major policy 
issues, then intermediate problems come to be 
the government's objectives, while the terminal 
problems of the social system accumulate and 
grow worse. What we are now witnessing in 
Latin America, with few exceptions, is the ascen-
dancy of micro-policy over major policy issues, of 
short-term pragmatism over the statesman's 
imagination and will, of routine over creation. 
We are witnessing the dissociation of govern-
ment tactics from government strategy, and this 
gives rise to governors who are governed by the 
press of events. The tide draws us along on an 
indefinite course. Those who lead us do not lead. 
The conventional politician is trapped, 
preoccupied and entangled by a web of relation-
ships which he sees as the world of his practical 
struggle: projects, obstacles, and successes. He 
lives in a world of the immediate matters with 
which he is occupied, but in reality they occupy 
the attention he could otherwise give to the 
major problems of the social system. For him, 
major social problems are a universal constant 
within which he experiences the tense and crea-
tive variety of his daily affairs. He cannot choose 
whether to concern himself with the terminal 
problems of the social system or to immerse 
himself in the day-to-day rush of intermediate 
problems in the political system. The system 
chooses for him. 
If he is to survive in this overwhelming 
political struggle, he must become engrossed in 
his day-to-day affairs and put off reflecting upon 
his overall political purpose. Indeed, he is very 
busy, has no time, is constantly interrupted by 
meetings and telephone calls; he is enslaved by 
the demands of just surviving in the cold world 
of politics. Thus he discovers that politics is 
politicking rather than trying to resolve the ter-
minal problems of the social system. These 
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problems are only his working environment, not 
the object of his attention. 
THESIS No. 4: We must reform our planning 
systems, modernize our techniques of govern-
ment and transform our political culture in order 
for electoral platforms, taken seriously, to 
become government plans, in order for govern-
ment plans to become government action, and in 
order for government action to have an impact 
on national problems, i.e., on the terminal prob-
lems of the social system. Then, democracy will 
find its defence in its works. 
Along with government programmes, 
which are strategically differential, we must 
develop the capacity to rise above mere tactical 
differences in order to provide an opportunity 
for consensus concerning national schemes for 
ensuring the long-term continuity of progress in 
the countries of Latin America. This is both 
technically and politically possible, because 
experience demonstrates that there are common 
problems which require common solutions, 
regardless of the differential political utopias 
which we champion. 
This is the major task of the political parties: 
to shape new generations of leaders capable of 
articulating micro-policy with major policy, to 
create research and educational institutions 
which will provide them with support in per-
forming the functions of government and oppo-
sition, to furnish guidance in the selection of 
major national and regional strategic options, 
and to generate a class of public managers capa-
ble of winning out over the bureaucratic tangle 
and adapting public organizations to the needs 
of government action and the participation of 
the people. 
THESIS No. 5: The key to the success of a plan-
ning system lies in the articulation of executive 
planning with operational planning (see fig-
ure 3). If executive planning at the level of the 
national president and his cabinet has no force, 
then operational planning carried out by the 
ministries and the directorates of public agencies 
can have no practical effect. The converse is also 
true, but the main problem in Latin America is 
the absence, in some cases, and the weakness, in 
others, of executive planning. Where it is absent, 
the order of the day is improvisation, arrogantly 
based on so-called political experience which is 
often no more than experience in tackling the 
political system's intermediate problems and 
inexperience in coping with the terminal prob-
lems of the social system. The arrogance of a few 
powerful practising politicians, on the one hand, 
and the mediocrity of many, on the other, consti-
tute the principal barrier to the technicalization 
of the process of government. 
Planning is a tool of government, not a sys-
tem of research and economic advisory services. 
Planning is also confused with the on-the-spot 
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There will never be genuine and effective plan-
ning in the countries of Latin America so long as 
presidential staffs and cabinets conduct their 
affairs as they do now: unsystematically, unselec-
tively, in a disorganized manner and bereft of 
technical support. Under the prevailing system, 
the national president is weighed down by daily 
affairs, has little or no control over significant 
events, is constantly surprised by circumstances, 
and devotes his time to the solution of interme-
diate problems of minor importance. Conse-
quently, the governments do not provide 
guidelines to their planning offices, which are 
thus left to debate among themselves whether 
they should provide their own definition, ther-
eby invading the sphere of high-level policy, or 
remain relegated to the role of serving as centres 
for the calculations required for immediate and 
partial actions lacking in direction. 
THESIS No. 6: A primitive executive system 
cannot lead or govern a complex dynamic, uncer-
tain and résistent social system. Social systems 
determine their own results, and their governors 
are governed by the press of day-to-day events. 
Hence, the first task is to improve the govern-
ment authorities' capacity to govern, to moder-
nize the modernizers and to reform the 
reformers. Only they themselves can do this, by 
becoming aware of their weaknesses, appreciat-
ing the value of the sciences and techniques of 
government, and paving the way for new gener-
ations that will promote change. 
The executive level of government should 
not only be active, creative and express a willing-
ness to resolve the problems that exist, but 
should also be effective, organized, informed and 
able to anticipate social needs. In short, the exec-
utive function should employ the most produc-
tive means of planning and management, such 
that it will meet the requirement of variety, as 
expressed by Ashby, who wisely said that an 
executive or leadership system which wishes to 
control or lead another must exhibit greater var-
iety than the system to be controlled or led. In 
the experience of Latin America, the many 
dynamic forces of the social system display more 
variety than their governments. 
THESIS No. 7: Economic planning should be 
transformed into the planning of government 
action. Accordingly, the architectural concept of 
planning should be abandoned, inasmuch as this 
concept results in the identification of the plan 
with its design, thereby overlooking the political 
problem of the shortage of resources of power. 
The design of what "ought to be" is only the 
beginning of the planning problem. Plans are 
always devised in either a resistant or a condu-
cive environment, but never in a neutral one. 
The resistance or encouragement may be either 
active or passive. Social forces use their political 
influence m pursuing partially conflicting objec-
tives. Routine takes the form of an anonymous 
plan. Prevailing trends are sometimes more 
forceful than government action. The random or 
chance factors which are ushered in by those 
variables that are beyond our control tip the 
balances against us or in our favour. Opposition 
forces introduce the uncertainty of the human 
factor involved in any interactive calculus. 
Nature takes us by surprise with unknown varia-
bles. The international sphere which surrounds 
us either strengthens or contradicts the trend of 
national variables. Planning must not be a strait-
jacket which allows the expression of our will 
alone, while we ignore the will of other social 
agents, the influence of nature or the effects of 
international factors. Planning must not be 
purely normative; it must also be strategic and 
situational. It must articulate political effective-
ness with economic effectiveness. 
THESIS No. 8: Planning within a resistant 
environment or in situations of shared power 
cannot be conceived of simply as the planning of 
measures to be executed by a hierarchical struc-
ture, but instead must be seen as the planning of 
a conflictive structure which intersects with a 
hierarchical one (see figure 4). In a conflictive 
structure, no agent has decisive power over the 
others; consequently, the plan of any single 
agent can be successful only if it wins out over 
the resistance of its opponents. The success of a 
plan advocated by some agents therefore neces-
sarily entails the defeat of the plan espoused by 
others. However, in a hierarchical structure, the 
executive level issues planning directives whose 
fulfillment by subordinate agencies is manda-
tory. The serious oversimplification of which 
traditional normative planning is guilty is its 
assumption that this is done within a hierarchi-
cal structure and to a social system that follows 
certain laws. This is why some traditional 
planners —the blindest ones— long for a com-
pulsory type of planning. A theoretician of con-
flict at its extreme such as Clausewitz would 
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Figure 4 
EXECUTIVE PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Conflictive structure 
Hierarchical structure 
smile at the idea of demanding that one's enemy 
follow ones own battle plan. Compulsory plan-
ning is a fantasy; there are only agents with 
differing degrees of power, but their power is 
always limited, even in the type of socialist sys-
tem having the greatest concentration of power. 
Situational planning within a partly conflic-
tive, partly hierarchical structure exhibits the 
following characteristics: 
i) It includes creative and repetitive, qualita-
tive and quantitative processes. In part, the 
social system does follow laws and can be 
explained to a limited degree by mathematical 
models, but primarily it creates laws. Creative 
processes can only be addressed by means of an 
interactive calculus, for which some of the avail-
able tools are games, tests, manoeuvres, tech-
niques of negotiation, expert opinions and direct 
political consultation. In addition, the social pro-
cess involves aspects of quality and quantity 
whose relative position in the hierarchy of 
meaning should be preserved. The important 
issue in social analysis is the accuracy of the 
propositions involved, and their accuracy is par-
tially a question of precision in the use of linguis-
tic variables, and only partially a problem of 
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measurement. If we do not recognize the concept 
of accuracy as being broader than that of mea-
surement, we can easily fall into the error of 
quantifying secondary aspects and failing to dif-
ferentiate among the quality of different 
situations. 
ü) It employs the methods of operational 
planning within the hierarchical structure. In 
operational planning there are also a strategy 
and a tactic, but in this case the objectives are 
determined by high-level directives and are con-
sequently more rigid, the planning involved is 
more technical, the agents are teams formed by 
operational units subordinate to higher author-
ity, opponents are restricted to factional forces in 
a limited situational domain, and the means of 
carrying out the plan are allocated by a higher 
level in the organizational structure. 
üi) Within the context of a conflíctive struc-
ture, executive planning requires strategic and 
situational planning. When agents are involved 
in a conflict over plans, each one develops strate-
gies for defeating its opponents, and each stra-
tegy is based on the agent's own situation and on 
that of its opponent. Thus, the reality surround-
ing both is seen differently by each. Without the 
concept of situation, a theory of strategy is 
impossible. Executive planning has flexible 
objectives, is more political, is carried out by 
high-level authorities, has greater freedom in 
choosing its opponents and its allies, and has no 
one to look to for the means or resources needed, 
but must instead create them during the actual 
process of conflict. 
iv) It requires the development of an inter-
active calculus in order to deal with the uncer-
tainty to which the relations among social agents 
give rise. When the plans of the various agents 
are in conflict, the matter of which of one agent's 
plans is seen as being the most effective by that 
agent depends upon which plan is singled out as 
being the most effective by other agents, and vice 
versa. This is where interactive calculus comes 
in, which cues us to regard the plan as an inter-
play among social agents; this is the essence of 
the creative processes in a social system, because 
it challenges our imagination and creativity as 
they are pressed into the service of strategic 
judgements. 
v) It requires the use of the concept of situa-
tion in order to explain reality, since the various 
social agents experience different realities 
according to the positions they occupy in the 
social system. The concept of diagnostic analysis 
sidesteps the problem posed by the different 
explanations of social agents and seeks a single 
absolute truth, which hampers an understanding 
of reality. The concept of situation, however, 
facilitates an understanding of the conflict and 
increases the possibility of consensus, in that 
both presuppose a knowledge of the opponent's 
and the potential ally's explanations. If we are 
aware that our view of the world is a personal 
view relative to our own position in the social 
system, then whenever we find ourselves to be in 
contradiction or opposition to other people or 
forces, we can learn to coexist with them. If our 
attitude is not one which binds us to what we see 
from our own vantage point or in terms of our 
own situation, if we realize that others see reality 
in accordance with the situation or environment 
in which they live, and if we acknowledge the 
fact that their view may be just as valid as our 
own, even if it seems undesirable to us, then we 
will be more willing to talk and to understand. If 
we nevertheless decide to fight, then we will 
have a better grasp of our opponents' 
motivations. 
vi) It posits the existence of a wide range of 
scarce resources and, hence, of a wide range of 
criteria of effectiveness. It must be assumed that 
each social agent is restricted by a vector quantity 
of scarce resources which the agent must manage 
efficiently in order to achieve its objectives. This 
vector quantity of scarce resources includes such 
elements as political power, economic resources, 
a natural-resource production capacity, knowl-
edge and information, values, etc. Producing any 
social fact or event requires the application of 
this vector of resources, and the effectiveness of 
the events thus produced reflects back on the 
agent and either increases or decreases the 
resource constraints affecting it. Thus, there is 
no one absolute criterion of effectiveness —in 
contrast to the way in which the economic criter-
ion of effectiveness is treated in normative 
planning— but rather multiple criteria, whose 
relative importance depends upon the character-
istics of the situation and the nature of the objec-
tives pursued. Thus, we may speak of political 
effectiveness, economic effectiveness, ecological 
effectiveness, cognitive effectiveness, ideologi-
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cal/cultural effectiveness, etc., and it is not 
always possible to express one in terms of the 
others. 
vii) It shifts the focus of planning to the 
present and to the high-level political situational 
calculus which precedes decisions and guides 
them, rather than concentrating exclusively on 
partial medium-term technical calculations. The 
future is shaped only in the present, and'this is 
the end purpose of planning. Nevertheless, the 
decisions taken today will be rational, not in 
relation to the present situation, but in relation 
to future situations. Hence, medium- and long-
term plans play an essential role in providing 
direction, but they do not perform their entire 
function unless they take the form of a calculus 
which precedes current action and guides it. 
viÜ) It replaces the book-plan with an inven-
tory of operations which are ready for imple-
mentation in foreseeable situations and in 
contingencies; this inventory is constantly being 
renewed as the situation changes. 
In traditional planning, the categories of 
programmes, policies, projects, recommenda-
tions, approaches, etc., may be ambiguous 
because no attempt is made to provide an 
exhaustive coverage for all possible decisions 
and because they do riot constitute consistently-
defined modules of action. In contrast, a basic 
principle of situational planning is that the 
entire plan is expressed in terms of operations or 
action modules. Thus, an executive programme 
is a form of selecting and articulating the opera-
tions included in the plan. This selection and 
articulation can, of course, be conducted only in 
relation to a strategy of action which imparts 
consistency and direction to them. 
The plan can be viewed as a communications 
structure containing an articulated system of 
various types of "speech acts". Actually, it 
includes the five types covered in conversational 
theory (Searleand Flores). It contains assertions, 
inasmuch as both traditional diagnostic analysis 
and situational explanation are primarily com-
posed of assertions regarding the process by 
which problems are produced. The truth or 
falsehood of these assertions must then be deter-
mined on the basis of practical experience, or a 
provisional value of truth or falsehood must be 
assigned to them by means of process 
simulation. 
The plan contains expressions, since it quali-
fies facts and events by using adjectival phrases 
which accept, reject and rank the above-
mentioned assertions. For example, in the 
explanatory portion of a plan we congratulate 
ourselves on certain results when a high growth 
rate in the gross domestic product is achieved, 
and we express regret about or condemn certain 
situations when we declare levels of critical pov-
erty to be unacceptable. 
The plan contains statements because it both 
designates the persons responsible for designing 
and executing the operations included in the 
plan and ranks various spheres of action. For 
example, we give priority to certain problems 
and operations when we state that, within cer-
tain limits, the unemployment problem is more 
important than inflation. 
It contains commands because it orders 
others (the people designated by the above-
mentioned statements) to execute certain tasks 
and to assume certain duties. For example, the 
plan may order a Minister for Foreign Relations 
to execute operation 04/07. 
Finally, the plan also contains commitments, 
because those responsible for the plan commit 
themselves to carrying out its proposals. The 
operational aspects of the plan are commitments 
which, in the final analysis, its author makes to 
the population and the social forces of a country. 
In situational planning, operations consti-
tute commitments to do something to modify 
the characteristics of one or more problems. 
These commitments are assumed by the presi-
dent and his cabinet, as the highest officials in 
the country. Of course, solely for operational 
purposes, the president delegates (through a 
statement) the responsibility of fulfilling and 
validating these commitments to other officials. 
Thus, the central components of the plan are 
commitments, which are complemented by 
statements and commands. A plan's credibility is 
determined by its record in fulfilling its 
commitments. 
The purpose of the situational plan is 
expressed exclusively in the form of operations 
and the modules into which they are divided. It is 
therefore necessary to define exactly what an 
operation is in order to: i) prevent the modules 
of the plan from being composed solely of asser-
tions, expressions or merely commands and 
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statements, and ii) ensure that the modules of 
the plan, taken together, cover all the actions 
promised, without ambiguous duplications. Of 
course, the plan is also a process of communica-
tion containing the speech acts mentioned ear-
lier, but they are not its central purpose. 
It should be emphasized that an operation is 
a commitment. What, however, is it a commit-
ment to do? Obviously, it is not a commitment to 
make another commitment, to make an asser-
tion or to utter an expression, a command or a 
statement. The answer is that it is a commitment 
to action, but what kind of action? It should be 
noted that Austin and Searle had to create the 
concept of a "speech act" because man does 
things through words, and the distinction 
between "doing" and "saying" is not a clear one. 
Truly, we do when we speak, but we do not do as 
much as we say. 
At this point it will be helpful to draw a 
distinction between "act" and "action" that may 
be relevant to the problem at hand. Within this 
context, "acts" may be defined as the speech acts 
that antecede actions in the chain of production, 
while "actions" will refer to the effects that fol-
low upon these speech acts in the system of 
social production, through which certain means 
are used to: a) modify social behaviour, b) build 
and modify social production capacities, and 
c) modify the rules governing social production. 
Action is the tool used to change a situation, 
while acts are the tools used to produce actions. 
Using these definitions, an operation can be said 
to be a commitment to carry out one or more 
actions. This commitment must not, however, 
be ambiguous, general or vague. On the contrary, 
it should meet the following requirements: 
a) To specify clearly the person directly 
responsible for carrying it out and to identify 
clearly those who are to reap the benefits or 
make the sacrifices; 
b) To spell out the specific means to be used to 
achieve the desired effects and results 
(actions, subactions and regulatory actions); 
the design of an operation should be refined 
until it is sufficient for its implementation; 
c) To project the dimension and scope of the 
expected results and to identify these results 
clearly in terms of their modification of the 
nexuses making up the definitional vector of 
the problem in question; 
d) To conform, at the time the commitment is 
made, to intentions to produce the results 
outlined (since an event which occurs by 
accident, by mistake or inadvertently may 
have unexpected positive or negative results 
which do not constitute an operation); 
e) To make a claim upon resources and to spec-
ify the amount of resources required; some 
operations demand a large input of resour-
ces of power, others call for an intensive use 
of economic resources, and some require a 
large amount of both; and 
f) To establish the time span within which the 
commitment should be discharged and the 
desired results can be achieved. 
An operation is a commitment to carry out 
actions which is assumed by a specific agent and 
explicitly based on a projection that the conse-
quences attributable to the means selected will 
coincide to a considerable degree with the 
desired results in the targeted situation. 
Operations and actions are clearly distinct 
from other acts such as recommending, adopting 
action criteria, establishing a position or 
announcing any event whose purpose is vague or 
whose author is not specified. Thus, the vague 
wording of traditional economic plans would be 
replaced by a precisely defined set of operations. 
THESIS No. 9: The government programme, 
the governability of the social system and the 
capacity to govern form a system of relation-
ships upon which the effectiveness of the 
government's plan rests. However, a govern-
ment's plan can only be effective if it is backed by 
political and economic operational planning and 
if the executive level of government actively 
exercises leadership over the process through 
planning directives and an ongoing follow-up 
and assessment of situations as they develop. 
Hence, government and planning become inter-
mixed at the level of day-to-day decision-
making. 
The capacity to govern is only one of the 
components of a leadership triangle which at all 
times influences the leaders concerned. The 
governability of the system and the government 
scheme constitute, together with the capacity to 
govern, a system. A quite limited capacity to 
govern, in combination with a high degree of 
system governability deriving from abundant 
resources and the disorganization of opposing 
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social forces, makes possible a government 
scheme which will not be very conflictive or very 
vigorous but which will nonetheless be suffi-
ciently effective to maintain the stability of the 
system. 
Capacity to govern 




The governability of a system is a relative 
concept which denotes the relationship between 
the variables we control and those that are 
beyond our control. It will not be the same in a 
democracy as in a totalitarian system, in a 
scheme aimed at management as in one directed 
towards social change, in a situation of abun-
dance as in one where resources are scarce. Each 
element in the triangle of leadership is relative 
to the others, and the governability of the system 
is therefore relative to the capacity to govern and 
the government scheme. It is not a static concept 
either because, as the situation changes, the sys-
tem may become more or less governable to the 
extent that variants are converted into options 
and resource constraints are overcome as greater 
freedom of action is achieved. 
The limited capacity to govern of a conven-
tional political structure is sometimes enough to 
produce good results if the system is highly gov-
ernable and the government scheme is not very 
ambitious. However, a limited capacity to gov-
ern is a severe restraint in systems which are of a 
low degree of governability due to a shortage of 
resources or to the nature of their political struc-
tures. Naturally, a limited capacity to govern is 
an even more restrictive factor when leaders 
undertake very demanding schemes of social 
change. 
Figures 5 and ó illustrate the various spheres 
in which the process of government takes place 
and the overall system which structures them. 
In sphere "A", the government scheme is 
defined through executive planning. The trans-
lation of this government scheme into practical 
action requires (in "C") action strategies and 
political and economic directives, which focus on 
the political guidance of the government (in 
"B") and on public management and economic 
guidance (in "D"). The systematic provision of 
techno-political support is essential in all four 
spheres of the process of government. 
Operations-based management is a system 
of leadership and administration by objectives. It 
is, therefore, a type of management that is based 
on action modules, which can and should corres-
pond to the modules of the plan. In this sense, 
operations-based management is an essential 
system in the organizational apparatus of the 
system of planning and government. The leader-
ship of a government can only ensure that its 
day-to-day economic actions serve the ends 
pursued by its plans if the modules of the plan 
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actions, etc.) are articulated with the modules of 
its budget (programmes, subprogrammes, activ-
ities, etc.) and if both correspond to managerial 
activity that is organized with a view to their 
execution (management based on operations, 
actions, etc.). 
Consequently, the basic organizational 
requirement at the practical level in order for a 
government to function effectively, validating 
its plans with results, lies in the existence of the 
triangular system: modular plan —budget by 
programmes— operations-based management. 
Obviously, the operations-based system of man-
agement requires that high-level leadership, in 
turn, should also be an operations-based system. 
This operations-based system of high-level 
leadership calls for changes in some of the rou-
tine habits typical of traditional forms of govern-
ment. A number of the more important changes 
of this sort are the following: 
a) New functional modalities with respect to 
the president's cabinet with a view to ensur-
ing that it periodically follows up on the 
problems encountered in the course of 
operations; 
b) New modalities as regards the ministers' 
accounting for the progress of the opera-
tions for which they are responsible; 
c) New procedures and criteria in regard to the 
discussion and approval of the programme-
by-programme budget in the national 
congress; 
d) The establishment of a responsive and effec-
tive system for decentralized monitoring of 
the progress of operations and actions so 
that problems relating to the execution and 
effective guidance of operations will be 
resolved on a decentralized basis and will 
therefore have to be brought to the attention 
of ministers or the cabinet only in excep-
tional cases; and 
e) A speedy system of situational planning to 
assess new situations, evaluate results, adjust 
the scope and design of operations, adopt 
new operations, and arrive swiftly at the 
decisions called for by each new situation. 
This system of high-level leadership can 
only exist, however, if it is backed up by a 
decentralized resource system of operations-
based management at the various levels of 
public-sector institutions and agencies. 
Neither the plan nor the budget-by-
programmes system can operate in a substantive 
manner in the absence of an operations-based 
system of management. If this is lacking, no 
agents will be truly responsible for the opera-
tions provided for in the strategic plan, and the 
budget programmes will be no more than a 
façade disguising the traditional practice of 
budgeting on the basis of institutions and agen-
cies, without any clearly-defined objectives or 
established internal and external criteria for the 
productivity and effectiveness of public 
management. 
THESIS No. 10: The practices of government 
are flawed at both its "head" and its "feet". A 
careful examination of figure 6 will show that 
the major weaknesses of government practice in 
Latin America are to be found in the areas of 
executive planning and operations manage-
ment. The absence of an operations-based man-
agement system means that a modular system of 
operations-based situational planning and a sys-
tem of budgeting by programme can exist only in 
a formal sense. Without a system of 
management-by-objectives, the operations pro-
vided for in the plan will be a dead letter, and 
budgetary programmes will exist in name only. 
Executive planning is the "head" of the system 
and operations-based management serves as its 
"feet". The process of government cannot be 
effective if it is lightheaded and its feet are 
weighed down. The head then fails to provide 
guidance or produce directives relevant to the 
solution of national problems, while the feet will 
then plod along on their own account without 
any definite direction. This is the dilemma of 
democracy. On the one hand, the head's capacity 
for self-criticism is so greatly diminished that it 
claims to be misunderstood by the people when 
it loses the elections. On the other hand, the feet 
would only be able to free themselves from their 
bureaucratic deadweight through an unimagina-
ble act of autonomous self-renewal which would 
be out of keeping with the faculties of the lower 
extremities. It would be like trying to pull one-
self up by the scruff of one's own neck. Only a 
renewed and deep-seated awareness of major 
policy among the leaders of society can resolve 
this problem. 
